Theory development in both psychology and neuroscience can benefit by consideration of both behavioral and neural data sets. However, the development of appropriate methods for linking these data sets is a difficult statistical and conceptual problem. Over past decades, different linking approaches have been employed in the study of perceptual decision-making, beginning with rudimentary linking of the data sets at a qualitative, structural level, culminating in sophisticated statistical approaches that quantitatively link the data sets. We outline a new approach, in which a single model is developed that jointly addresses neural and behavioral data. This approach allows for specification and testing of quantitative links between neural and behavioral aspects of the model. Estimating the model in a Bayesian framework allows both data sets to equally inform the estimation of all model parameters. The use of a hierarchical model architecture allows for a model which accounts for variability between neurons. We demonstrate the approach by re-analysis of a classic data set containing behavioral recordings of decision-making with accompanying single-cell neural recordings. The joint model is able to capture most aspects of both data sets, and also supports the analysis of interesting questions about prediction, including predicting the times at which responses are made, and the corresponding neural firing rates.
Introduction
For more than 50 years, mathematical theories of simple decision-making have been based on the notion of "evidence accumulation". Evidence accumulation explains behavioral and neurophysiological data by assuming that decisions are made by gradually accumulating evidence from the environment in favor of each possible choice. The first choice to accumulate a threshold amount of evidence is selected (see Figure 1A ). Through variations on this basic theme, accumulator models of decision-making have explained dozens of robust empirical phenomena (Palmer & Shadlen, 2005; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Van Zandt & Proctor, 2000) , and have been used as measurement tools to understand important problems including clinical disorders (Ho et al., 2014) , alcohol intoxication (van Ravenzwaaij, Dutilh, & Wagenmakers, 2012) , sleep deprivation (Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2011) , and many others.
More recently, neurophysiological research has provided insights into the neural underpinnings of decision-making (for reviews, see : Glimcher, 2003; Shadlen & Kiani, 2013; Purcell, Schall, Logan, & Palmeri, 2012; Mulder, Van Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014) . Links between neurophysiology and cognitive models allow the possibility of testing cognitive models on their ability to simultaneously account for both behavioral and neural data. Many researchers agree that this "neuro-cognitive modeling" approach has the potential to provide important insights into psychological and neuroscientific questions. However, the information gained by this joint approach requires coherent solutions for integrating the neural and behavioral data.
Detailed links between neurophysiology and cognitive decision-making models
The initial links between neurophysiology and cognitive decision-making were drawn when researchers noticed that certain cortical neurons in monkeys behaved similarly to the basic structures assumed in evidence accumulation models (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Hanes & Schall, 1996; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Schall, 2001; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001; Schall, 2003; Glimcher, 2003) . For example, certain types of neurons in the frontal eye fields (FEF) and lateral intraparietal (LIP) areas of macaque monkeys behave analogously to the "accumulator" structures in evidence accumulation models: those neurons accumulate evidence towards a threshold, and a behavioral response follows soon after (see Figure 1B ). Of course, the analogy is much more sophisticated than this:
• A neuron in FEF reaches a stereotyped and invariant firing rate just before a response is initiated.
• The time the neuron takes to reach maximum firing rate is related to the decision time of the monkey.
• The activity of the neuron can predict behavioral responses, even when those responses contradict stimulus evidence, and even when the stimulus contains no evidence (for reviews, see: Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Schall, 2003) . Usher and McClelland (2001) explored the relationship between neurophysiology and cognitive decision-making by developing their accumulator model of simple decisionmaking with careful consideration of the dual constraints imposed by neurophysiology and psychology. Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, Happ, and Shadlen (2011) identified particular neural trajectories with the trajectories of accumulator processes in their model. Other researchers have linked neural and behavioral models by identifying experimental manipulations which should induce corresponding qualitative differences in model parameters and neurophysiological measurements (Ho, Brown, & Serences, 2009; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Heitz & Schall, 2013) .
The tightest links between neural and behavioral data can be made by jointly (i.e., simultaneously) modeling the two data sets. As well as increasing the breadth of explanation offered by a theory, jointly modeling neural and behavioral data more tightly constrains the theory's predictions. This constraint improves model identifiability and can shine light on aspects of the theory that are not otherwise easy to examine (a point also made by Purcell et al., 2010) . For example, cognitive models of decision-making include a latent parameter which represents the composite of two distinct processes (a "non-decision time" parameter, which represents time taken for stimulus input processes and for response output processes). As we will show, these two processes can be separately identified when the neurophysiological data and the behavioral data are addressed simultaneously. Another key advance of this approach over post-hoc (or two-stage) linking approaches is that joint models allow neural data to inform understanding of the behavioral aspects of the model, and vice versa. B. M. Turner, Forstmann, et al. (2013) developed an innovative approach to joint modeling in which separate neural and behavioral models were linked -by allowing covariance between the models' parameters -and the entire ensemble was estimated together. The joint model and one-stage estimation procedure allows for exploratory analysis of relationships between neural and behavioral models. We expand on this, and other important comparisons between two-stage and joint modeling approaches in A comparison of Two-Stage Modeling and Joint Modeling in the discussion section.
Jointly modeling neural and behavioral data

Time S'mulus Onset
Respond "left" at 0.653 sec.
Respond "left" at 0.811 sec.
Respond "left" at 1.357 sec.
Respond "right" at 0.584 sec.
A. DATA. Behavioural data consist of responses and response 'mes (4 trials are shown). Neural data are spike 'me series recorded from LIP neurons during each trial. In this example, the recep've field of the neuron corresponds to "right" s'mulus type. The two--choice decision is modelled as a race between two accumulators. The result of the race makes predic'ons for the overt response (which accumulator won) and for the response 'me (how long the race took). The trajectory of the accumulator corresponding to "right" responses is linked to the firing rate of the Poisson process used to describe the neural data. The firing rate during the accumula'on phase (red segment) is a linear func'on of the height of the corresponding accumulator (red arrow).
Behavioural Neural
Figure 2. Our modeling approach. Purcell et al. (2010) proposed a model for confirmatory analysis with specific and tightly-constrained links between the neural and behavioral elements. The model assumed precise quantitative links between accumulators in cognitive models and physiological structures (see Figure 1C) . The theory is evaluated by recording the timing of action potentials (spikes) from both the evidence-producing neurons (visual neurons in the FEF of the macaque) and the evidence-accumulating neurons (movement neurons). The recorded spikes from the visual neurons are used to drive evidence accumulation in a cognitive accumulator model, and the resulting evidence accumulation trajectories are compared against the measured trajectories of the movement neurons.
Purcell et al.'s work marked an important theoretical advance: theirs was the first work to quantify, within a model, the assumed link between neural data and a cognitive accumulator model (the trajectory of an evidence accumulator). The work presented in this paper builds on the work of Purcell et al. by making a more comprehensive link between the neural and behavioral data sets via an explicit model of the neural data (Purcell et al . mapped the cognitive model directly to neural firing rates) and a function for linking parameters of the neural and accumulator models. The explicit joint model allows us to address interesting questions that were not previously possible, such as "conditional on observing a certain response time, what neural data are likely?", and the converse question, "conditional on observing certain neural data, what response time is likely?". By quantifying answers to these questions, the joint model supports multiple ways of testing theories against observed data. We use a computationally tractable decision-making model (the linear ballistic accumulator, or LBA, model: Brown & Heathcote, 2008) and a simple neural model (an inhomogeneous Poisson process). The joint model was implemented in a Bayesian framework and includes hierarchical structures to account for random variation between neurons from different recording sessions and different stimuli conditions.
A Decision-Making Model for Neural and behavioral Data
Data We evaluated our model using data from a seminal experiment reported by Roitman and Shadlen (2002) . In the "response time" segment of the experiment, Roitman and Shadlen had two monkeys, denoted "B" and "N", make thousands of binary decisions about the motion direction of a random dot kinematogram. On each trial, a random dot kinematogram appeared on screen and the monkey indicated whether the coherently-moving dots were drifting left or right. There were six levels of decision difficulty manipulated by changing the proportion of coherently-moving vs. randomly-moving dots. Response times and choices were recorded from each trial, as well as the timing of action potentials from carefully-selected neurons in the lateral intraparietal area of the cortex. A different neuron was selected for recording during each experimental session. Some further details of the procedure and data structure are given in Appendix A, but for full details see the original publication 1 .
Model
The core element of our model is a simple accumulator model of decision-making, the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA: Brown & Heathcote, 2008 ). The LBA model has been successfully applied to a large range of simple perceptual choice tasks, including the random dot kinematogram (Ho et al., 2009; Forstmann et al., 2008 Forstmann et al., , 2010 , and to behavioral decision-making data from monkeys (Heitz & Schall, 2012; Cassey, Heathcote, & Brown, 2014) . The LBA models the decision between left-vs. right-moving motion as a race between two accumulators, one of which represents the decision to respond "left" and the other which represents the decision to respond "right" (see Figure 1A) . When the stimulus is presented, activity in these accumulators grows linearly. When the activity of either accumulator reaches a pre-set threshold, a decision is made and a response is triggered. The rate of growth in activity is called the "drift rate", and it is typically larger for the accumulator whose response matches the stimulus than for the accumulator whose response does not, however there is trial-by-trial random variation in the drift rate, which leads to occasional incorrect choices. By specifying the parameters of the model (the height of the response threshold, the distribution of the drift rates, etc.) the model makes predictions for the joint distribution over response choice and response time (see appendix B for details).
We expand the LBA model to include neural data in two steps (see Figure 2) . We first define a simple statistical model for the neural data (single cell recordings) collected by Roitman and Shadlen (2002) . That model is a time-inhomogeneous Poisson process, where the spiking rate of the process follows a stereotyped path during each decision (see Figure 2B ). The spike rate is initially constant at a pre-stimulus baseline rate. Firing then dips and recovers just after the onset of the stimulus, then the spike rate increases steadily during the decision-making period itself, before finally falling rapidly to a low baseline after a decision is made. This firing rate path is specified by a number of parameters that correspond to the pre and post-decision baseline firing rates, the size and duration of the post-stimulus dip, and the time to reach the decision threshold (see Figure 3 for a schematic and Appendix C for details).
Linking neural and behavioral data
The key step in linking the cognitive model to the neural data is to link the section of the Poisson firing rate change that represents information accumulation (i.e. the steady increase in firing rate that takes place between stimulus onset and the response) with the increase in activity in the accumulators of the LBA model. This linking is illustrated by the red-colored elements in Figure 2B+C : the red line segment in Figure 2B shows the element of the neural firing rate that is linked to evidence accumulation, and the red accumulator trajectory in Figure 2C shows the LBA model element linked to the firing rate. It is possible to explore all kinds of complex links between these two elements, but we restricted our investigation to a simple linear link. That is, we assumed that a one-unit change in the trajectory (activation) of an LBA accumulator was equal to a fixed change in the firing rate of the neuron (only during the evidence accumulation or ramping phase). The key element of linking the model to the neural data is the dynamic link to the amount of evidence in the accumulator. This dynamic link is only for the pre-decision evidence accumulation phase. The post-decision decline in spiking rate is governed by a parameter of the neural model. For any time point in the accumulation stage the linking function proportionally scales changes in the LBA activation with changes in the Poisson firing rate. Although drift rates vary from trial to trial (following a normal distribution with mean and sd as model parameters estimated from data), the linking parameter is constant across trials. Formally this linking function is a free parameter of the model (θ), to be estimated from data. During the evidence accumulation period LBA activation is linked to neural firing rate by:
where λ(t) is the neural firing rate, x(t) is the current amount of evidence in the accumulator, A is the average starting activation of the LBA accumulators and α is the pre-stimulus baseline firing rate of the neuron. LBA accumulators have starting activation randomly (uniformly) distributed between zero and A, so their average is just A/2. However in all fits reported in the main text, we fixed starting activation at A = 0 (however, see Appendix F for results and discussion when A = 1). Future work could explore other linking functions -e.g., such as assuming that firing rate is a sigmoidal function of the evidence accumulator's state. The result of tightly linking the cognitive model to the neural and behavioral data is a coherent model that does not require separate estimation of the parameters of a neural model and a behavioral model. Instead, we jointly estimate posterior distributions over all parameters in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. We use the resulting estimates to illustrate how the model can address interesting questions about prediction. For example, the model can predict imminent behavioral responses and these behavioral predictions increase in accuracy as the model is conditioned on more and more neural data.
We show that previously inscrutable aspects of the LBA model are revealed in greater detail by the joint model of the neural and behavioral data. For example, the LBA includes an offset parameter (known as t 0 or T er ) that represents the time taken for non-decision processes, such as encoding of the stimulus and executing the motor response. Our statistical model for the neural data includes separate components representing the time taken for stimulus perception and the time taken for response execution. These two components remove the need for a single offset parameter, instead allowing us to fractionate the estimated offset time into a stimulus encoding period (δ) and a motor execution period(β).
We estimated the posterior distributions over the parameters of the joint model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. This is an important advance on previous work as it allows for neuronal variability to be taken into account. The hierarchy allows all model parameters to vary with recording session, which accommodates the tendency of the monkeys to take different behavioral approaches on different recording days, and the tendency for different neurons to have different basic properties, such as absolute firing rates. In non-hierarchical approaches it is necessary to normalize absolute firing rate. The hierarchy allows this empirical phenomenon to be modelled directly. These session-wise parameters were constrained to follow truncated normal distributions. The session-wise parameters, as well as the mean and standard deviation parameters of the group-level truncated normal distributions were estimated simultaneously, but separately for monkeys "B" and "N".
Results
Goodness of Fit
We first examined the goodness-of-fit of the model. We sampled posterior predictive data from the model by replicating the number of sessions and trials per session for each monkey 100 times. Each replication used an independent random draw of parameters from the appropriate session-specific posterior distribution. Conditional on these parameters, we used the LBA model to generate synthetic response times and choices, and used the evidence trajectories from the LBA model to specify the firing rate of the Poisson process which was used to generate neural data. We compared mean RT, full RT distributions, and spike rates between the posterior predictive data and the observed data. Figure 4 shows a coarse comparison between posterior predictive and observed behavioral data. Mean RT (left panel) and mean accuracy (right panel) are plotted for each monkey and each coherence condition. Throughout, we use black plots for Monkey B and red plots for Monkey N. The error bars illustrate uncertainty in the model predictions due to both finite sample size and posterior parameter variance. The model's predictions for mean RT match the data very closely. For Monkey B, the mean RT from the data and from posterior predictive data agree to within less than 6msec. across all coherence levels, and for Monkey N to within 26msec.. The match in predicted choice accuracy is also excellent for Monkey B (within 3% across all coherence levels), and is fair for Monkey N (except for a 6% mis-fit in the 0.064 coherence condition). For reference, these fits compare favorably with the simple statistical models traditionally fit to the such data summary statistics (e.g. see Fig. 3 of Roitman & Shadlen, 2002) . Figure 5 shows a more detailed comparison of response times between the model predictions and observed behavioral data. Each panel in Figure 5 shows a histogram of observed response times (grey bars) overlaid by the corresponding response time density calculated from the posterior predictive model data. All panels use the same axes, which illustrates how the number of correct responses increases in the easier decision conditions (i.e., with increasing stimulus coherence, shown in the first and third rows). The number of incorrect responses shrinks correspondingly, with no incorrect responses at all in the easiest condition. The noise in the data is much more apparent in these plots than in the plots of mean response time and accuracy, and it is clear that some conditions elicited response time distributions that do not resemble the kinds of distributions usually observed in human decision-making studies. For example, in the two most difficult decision conditions, Monkey N produced response time distributions that were negatively skewed. The LBA model misses the data in some of those conditions, which is unsurprising: the LBA is a model of human decision-making and is constrained by its architecture to predict peaked, positively-skewed distributions. Nevertheless, the data and model agree in most conditions to a reasonable degree. Figure 7 compares the observed neural data and associated joint model predictions ( Figure 8 shows the fit to the neural data for the neural only model). This figure replicates the data shown in the "T1" (or within receptive field) trials of Roitman and Shadlen's (2002) Figure 7A . In order to also include model fits on our graph, we have used a less compact arrangement, where each panel shows changes in neural spiking rate for a single monkey and a single stimulus coherence, as time unfolds during decision-making. Columns are ordered from most difficult decision (0 coherence) on the left to easiest decision (0.512 coherence) on the right. The first and second rows show data aligned on stimulus onset for each monkey, while the third and fourth rows show data aligned on response. Following Roitman and Shadlen (2002) , and since fewer and fewer trials contribute to the graphs at longer and longer response times, we have trimmed each graph at the median response time for its particular condition.
The data aligned on stimulus onset (upper two rows) show a steady, moderate firing rate before the stimulus, which rises approximately linearly before falling away. The model captures this trend well, but appears to miss the post-stimulus dip in firing rate which occurs in the first 100-150msec. after the stimulus appears. This may illustrate one aspect where the joint nature of the model has imposed difficult constraints: the model has estimated the dip-and-recover parameters (β and δ) to be small. This is due to the tendency of the LBA to estimate small values for non-decision time which are reflective with the behavioral artifacts of stimulus encoding and motor execution. This causes a superior fit to the behavioral data, at the cost of missing the post-stimulus dip in the neural data.
The data aligned to responses (lower two rows) show an approximately linear increase in firing rate until just a few milliseconds before the onset of the saccade (marked by the vertical green lines), followed by a rapid decline in firing rate to a new, much lower baseline. The model captures these effects very closely, via the timing and rate parameters (β, γ, and ω).
The posterior distributions over the parameters corresponding to the model fits above are detailed in Table 2 of Appendix E. These parameter estimates illustrate some interesting patterns. For example, Monkey B was more cautious than Monkey N (higher evidence threshold, b; this pattern holds when we allow for start point variability in model, see Appendix F). The time taken for firing rate to reduce to baseline after a response (parameter γ) was about 0.12sec., for both monkeys, but there was very large variability between neurons in this quantity (the corresponding σ estimate, which measures standard deviation across neurons, is about 0.24sec.). Similarly, the critical parameter linking neural and behavioral data (θ) varied greatly between neurons. The posterior distribution over θ suggests that about one neuron in six changed its firing rate by less than 10 spikes per second during the course of evidence accumulation. By comparison, the median change in firing rate during evidence accumulation was around 30 spikes per second.
Out-of-Sample Prediction Tests
In this section, we test the generalizability of the model by predicting data that were not used for model fitting. Because the joint model makes predictions for both neural and behavioral data, the predictive performance can be assessed by the difference between the predicted and observed response times and also by the difference between the predicted and observed spike counts. We predict both response times as well as spike rates using maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates.
For each session (i.e., neuron) and for each monkey, we randomly selected one-fifth of the trials as a test set, to be excluded from training. The posterior distributions over the model parameters were then calculated from the remaining data, and used to make predictions for the left-out data. For each left-out trial, we predicted the time at which the response would occur, and also the firing rate of the neuron (estimated by the number of spikes observed in each small window of time) conditioned on more and more of the data observed during that trial. That is, for any given left-out trial, the first prediction of response time and firing rate was made without allowing the model any knowledge of the data from the left-out trial. The next prediction was made allowing the model to condition its predictions on the first few spikes recorded during the left-out trial. The next prediction conditioned on a few more spikes, and so on until the model incorporated all data from the left-out trial (including the observed response and response time). At this stage, the average error of prediction between the model predicted RT and the actual RT is zero. By plotting the prediction error as a function of the duration of revealed data, we can compare different versions of the model. The hierarchical model is expected to outperform the non-hierarchical model as the hierarchical model can learn about individual neuron differences which allow it to differentiate its predictions for each particular neuron in the held out trial.
We made predictions for response times by finding, for each trial, that response time with the maximum a posteriori probability, conditioned on the maximum a posteriori parameter estimates calculated from the training data, calculated using Equation 3 from Appendix E. That equation depends on the observed spiking data for the trial in question, C ij , and this dependence allows us to condition the response time predictions on different amounts of revealed decision time. The effect of this is shown on the x-axes in section A of Figure 9 for a subset of coherences for Monkey N. For example, x = 0.5 shows the accuracy of response time predictions when the likelihood calculations include data that were observed during the first 0.5 sec after stimulus onset. Section B of Figure 9 shows the same effect of conditioning model predictions on increasing amounts of revealed data for the neural data. The solid lines in sections A and B of Figure 9 summarise the performance of the response time and spike count predictions, respectively, across all trials and across all samples of left-out data. The dashed lines illustrate that a model which fails to take into account the differences between neurons makes poorer predictions (i.e., larger prediction errors). This effect is larger for Monkey N than for Monkey B, because the amount of between-neuron variability in parameters was larger for Monkey N. To evaluate the averaged (non-hierarchical) model, we calculated MAP predictions as above, except that we conditioned on parameter estimates that were MAP across all neurons (rather than for the particular neuron associated with the left-out data). The prediction error graphs in sections A and B fall to zero on the right hand side because the prediction error is zero for any trial on which the response occurs during the "revealed" portion of the decision time. That is, the MAP estimator for a trial in which the decision time is known -by being observed -is exactly the observed decision time, the same is also true of the neural data.
The green circles in section A of Figure 9 show the average prediction error associated with the median response time. The median is guaranteed to minimise expected prediction error, in the sense of mean absolute deviation, amongst all estimators. For this reason, the median response time from each coherence condition almost always out-performs the model predictions, when comparing against model predictions that are not conditioned on any neural data at all (x = 0 in Figure 9 ). However, as more neural data are revealed, the model predictions improve and out-perform the median.
The incorporation of both behavioral and neural data in the joint model means that dynamics of behavioral data should change based on relevant dynamics of the neural data, and vice versa. Section C of Figure 9 demonstrates this effect of conditioning RTs on neural dynamics. For early portion of trials (< 0.6 seconds), we grouped empirical RTs based on whether the corresponding portion of the spike train had either few (≤14) or many (≥ 28) spikes. These response times are plotted as grey histograms in section C. We used the same grouping criteria with the posterior predictive data. We took RTs (< 0.6 seconds) generated out of the model which corresponded to spike trains (again generated from the model) with either few or many spikes. The posterior predictive response times are overlaid as red lines in section C. On trials where only few spikes occur in the early stage we would expect fewer saccades to be made relative to when many spikes occurred during the same window. A comparison between the observed and generated response times show that the model is sensitive to this, predicting fewer RTs in the left panel of section C than in the right panel.
Section C of Figure 9 demonstrates this effect of conditioning neural on behavioral dynamics. We grouped all the empirical spikes that corresponded to the RT ranges of 0.2 -0.5 or 0.7 -1 seconds. These are plotted as gray histograms, aligned both on stimulus onset (upper row) and response (bottom row). As before, we compared the observed data with the posterior predictive data by taking spike trains generated out of the model and grouping based on the same RT ranges (overlaid as red lines). The model identifies the different characteristics between the two ranges, with a faster ramping in spike rate for the faster RTs and a slower ramping of spike rate for the slower RTs. Response Time (seconds) Figure 9 . Predictive model performance for Monkey N. A. Prediction error (mean absolute difference, in seconds) when predicting response times from unseen data for coherence levels 0 and 0.256. Predictions are given by the MAP estimator conditioned on increasing durations of revealed data from each trial (x-axes). The solid line in each panel shows prediction error from the joint model that allows for individual neuron differences. The dashed line shows prediction error from an average (non-hierarchical) version of the joint model which does not account for parameter differences between neurons. The green dot in each panel shows the average error from the median RT for that condition. Median RT minimises expected prediction error, and so initially performs very well but does not condition on revealed neural data, so is soon out-performed by the model. As more data is revealed, prediction error drops and approaches zero when the temporal window includes the actual response and response time as observed information. B. Neural data prediction error for coherence levels 0 and 0.256, measured by the mean absolute difference between the observed and predicted spike counts in 0.05sec. bins. Predictions are given by the MAP estimator conditioned on increasing durations of revealed data from each trial (x-axes). The solid line in each panel shows prediction error from the joint model. The dashed line shows prediction error from a non-hierarchical version of the joint model which does not account for parameter differences between neurons. C. Response time distributions conditioned on spike trains. For the early stages of trials (i.e., < 0.6 seconds), for coherence level 0.256, resulting RTs are grouped based on whether the corresponding spike train portion had either few (≤14) or many (≥ 28) spikes, plotted as grey histograms. Posterior predictive RTs group according to the same criteria are overlaid as solid lines. D. Spike trains conditioned on response times. Empirical spike trains whose corresponding saccade was made in the RT range 0.2 -0.5 seconds or 0.7 -1 second are plotted. Posterior predictive spike trains from the same RT ranges are overlaid as solid lines.
Discussion
As with many research topics in psychology and neuroscience, the study of decisionmaking has been informed by both behavioral and neural data. Over past decades, different approaches have been taken to integrate the behavioral and neural evidence, with increasing statistical sophistication allowing tighter integration in recent years. Tighter integration can be important as it allows, among other things, more precise, quantitative testing of deep model assumptions about the link between behavior and neuroscience (e.g. Purcell et al., 2010; B. M. Turner, Forstmann, et al., 2013; B. Turner, Rodriguez, Norcia, McClure, & Steyvers, 2016) . We evaluated our model using data from a seminal experiment reported by Roitman and Shadlen (2002) . This experiment had two monkeys making thousands of decisions about random dot motion, with simultaneous recordings of behavioral data and action potentials from neurons involved in the decision-making process. The joint model was able to adequately fit the full distributions of response times, for both correct and incorrect responses, across the six different levels of decision difficulty. Simultaneously, the model fit the change in firing rate of decision-related neurons both across conditions as well as across time during each decision trial.
Not all of the behavioral model fits were quite as close to the data as is typical for the LBA (e.g., the fifth panel in the top row, and the second and fourth panels in the second row of Figure 5 ). We attribute this to two causes. Firstly, behavioral data from monkeys are not quite the same as behavioral data from humans, for which the LBA model was developed. In addition to species differences, it is typical for monkeys to undergo training which is an order of magnitude greater than is standard for human participants. It is possible that such training results in response time data with different characteristics to standard human experimentation, or perhaps there are differences in the underlying cognitive processes (c.f. Hawkins, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, & Brown, 2015) . However, the instances of misfit are most likely attributed to the fact that this instance of the LBA model is very tightly constrained because it must jointly account for the behavioral data and the neural data. This causes tension between adjusting parameters to optimise agreement with the behavioral data and adjusting parameters to optimise agreement with the neural data.
A comparison of Two-Stage Modeling and Joint Modeling
It is important to highlight some similarities and differences between our approach and previous approaches to linking behavioral and neural data streams. One common element in the work to date that has linked behavioral and neural data streams is the use of a two-stage approach (however see B. M. Turner, Forstmann, et al. (2013) ). In such approaches, first a model is fit to one of the data streams (typically a cognitive model is fit to the behavioral stream, such as response times). Secondly, based on the outcomes of the model fit, considerations are made about how elements of the model fit map onto elements of the other data stream (typically the neural stream). These considerations may be how accurately elements of the model predicts changes in (assumed) analogous elements of the neural data, such as changes in firing rates of single neurons (e.g., Hanes & Schall, 1996) or changes in amplitudes of EEG recordings (e.g., Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015) .
As discussed previously, (Purcell et al., 2010 ) used a more sophisticated two-stage approach. In addition to fitting the behavioral data, one element of the neural data was also used to inform specific mechanisms of various cognitive models. As such, elements of both data streams informed the initial first stage model fitting. Following this, the partneurally informed behavioral fits were then compared against an element of the neural data which was not used to inform the model fitting. Purcell et al. were able to perform informative model comparison as well as answer interesting prediction questions using this two-stage linking process.
The joint modeling framework outlined in this paper builds on the foundational work of Purcell et al. and B. M. Turner, Forstmann, et al. (2013) . Our novel approach links both data streams in a single step, within one framework. The joint model defines a specific, quantitative link between the neural and behavioral data, and allows parameters to be estimated simultaneously from both data sets. This framework allows the model to address interesting questions, such as making predictions for neural data on the basis of observed behavioral data, and importantly, make predictions for behavioral data on the basis of observed neural data, something which was not possible with the Purcell et al. approach. Our approach puts the behavioral and neural data sets on an equal footing, allowing information from each data set to inform estimation of all of the model parameters. It is this equality which means that the model can make predictions for neural data as well as for behavioral data. Our approach also allows testing and comparison of different quantitative assumptions about the links between model parameters (e.g., is the link between accumulated evidence and neural firing rate linear, or logarithmic?). Our approach also brings extra constraint to the model. For example, the parameter governing non-decision time in evidence accumulation models (t 0 here, often called T er in diffusion models) is under-constrained by behavioral data, but might be constrained by neural data. The model also allowed us to address interesting prediction questions. We illustrated how the model can make predictions for response times as well as for neural firing rates, and how these predictions can be conditioned on partially-observed data. When the predictions were conditioned on more and more partial data from each trial, the predicted response times and firing rates became more and more accurate.
Both approaches are informative for cognitive-neuroscience. As we see it, however, there are some important advantages to our novel framework. One of the promises of cognitive-neuroscience is that new (neural) data streams should constrain models. This constraint requires that neural data inform model fitting, not just model development. In the two-stage approach, neural data, or at least a portion of the neural data, are used as a post-hoc performance metric. This means that constraint is provided by the neural data only during model development. In our approach, all data (neural and behavioral) equally constrain model estimation. This has important consequences for model selection issues. The cross-validation approach that we used here provides a single, all inclusive, metric for model comparison, where both data streams equally inform about the suitability of model architecture. In the two-stage approach there is the potential for a tension between the importance of the two data streams. If one model provided a better fit for the behavioral data, but another model provided a better fit for the neural data, then what should we conclude? Further to this point, suppose one model provided a good fit to the behavioral data, then in second stage the model performed poorly in the prediction of the neural data. Generally in the literature this has led to the model being rejected. In our joint modeling framework, this same model, and underlying theory, may have fit both data streams well and should not have been rejected (at least on this metric) 2 .
Model comparison was a key feature of Purcell et al. (2010) , who compared multiple model architectures using their two-stage linking approach. While we did not try to distinguish between competing model architectures, our framework has great potential for solving model selection issues. As well as those outline above, the Bayesian implementation of our framework provides important and powerful statistical advantages in terms of model selection, with Bayesian model selection methods such as Bayes factors (?, ?), Deviance Information Criterion (Spiegelhalter, 1998) and Widely Applicable Information Criterion (Watanabe, 2010) all applicable. There is a need for Bayesian implementations of different model architectures before it is possible to use our framework to compare between them. However, we leave this pragmatic direction for future work.
A final distinction can also be drawn between our approach and that of Purcell et al. (2010) in terms of theory development. Both approaches had different levels of theoretical focus. Purcell et al. were interested in studying different system level implementations, that is, different cognitive model architectures. In this approach, the model itself is being studied as an object of interest. In the literature on the philosophy of computational modeling this approach has been termed abstract direct representation (c.f., Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Irvine, 2014; Weisberg, 2007) . Whereas, we focused on how data streams interact. The individual model architectures within the joint framework are somewhat auxiliary to the framework itself. This model-based theorizing focuses more on "...making novel claims about underlying, and as yet unobserved, structures or causal mechanisms" (p.17, Irvine, 2014 ).
Summary
We have described a novel joint model which simultaneously accounts for both behavioral (response times and saccades) and neural (spike trains) data from a perceptual decision making task. The predictive ability of the model is bi-directional; response times and saccades can be predicted from spike train data and vice versa. The key advance of our work is the importance attributed to both streams of data, allowing neural and behav-ioral data to simultaneously inform model estimation and our understanding of perceptual decision making.
Appendix A: Data
Let P be the number of neurons for a particular monkey (P=23 and P=31 for Monkey B and N respectively). Let N j be the number of trials recorded in a single session for neuron j. Unless otherwise noted, all behavioral and neural data are indexed by two subscripts: j representing sessions (j = 1 . . . P ) and i representing trials within sessions sessions (i = 1 . . . N j ).
Each trial involved the presentation of a random dot kinematogram with a particular direction and coherence. The stimulus direction was always either left or right, and coherence was one of six values (0, 0.032, 0.064, 0.128, 0.256, 0.512) . We use S ij and Q ij to denote direction and coherence, respectively. The behavioral data include vectors RT ij of response times and R ij of responses. The neural data are represented as a set of vectors, C. Each element, C ij , is a vector of random length containing the times of spike events recorded during a trial, measured relative to stimulus onset. Let n ij be the number of spikes recorded in trial i during session j so that vector C ij has length n ij . To model the spike data, we also introduce vectors T start and T end for the times at which recording began and ended. Roitman and Shadlen (2002) recorded continuously from the neurons during sessions, but we have clipped the recordings to always have T start ij = −0.11sec. and T end ij = RT ij + 0.31sec. The neural data are limited to recordings from one side of the decision process. In terms of the accumulator model, the neural data correspond to just one of the two accumulators. Thus, for about half of the trials, the monkey's response corresponded to the accumulator that was not being recorded (i.e. the response was away from the receptive field of the recorded neuron). These trials present a problem for modeling, as calculating likelihoods for observed behavioral data requires integration over the unobserved neural data as well as the unobserved finishing time for the accumulator corresponding to those neural data (unobserved, as this accumulator lost the race to threshold). To ease the computational burden associated with the integration, we restrict our modeling to trials on which the observed response was a saccade towards the receptive field of the neuron being recorded. Using the terminology of Roitman and Shadlen (2002) , we are using data from "T1" trials in which the monkey responded correctly, as well as from "T2" trials in which the monkey answered incorrectly. This restriction solves a problem of unobserved data, which would require integration otherwise. evidence trajectories). This setting (A = 0) also has precedent in modeling highly overpractised data from non-human primates , however, see Appendix F.
We constrained the other two parameters (t 0 and b) to be constant across all six coherence conditions. A benefit of our joint model is that the neural data constrains one of these parameters. The parameter t 0 is assumed to represent the time taken for two different processing stages: the time to perceive and encode the stimulus before decisionmaking can begin, and the time to execute the response after a decision is reached. The neural data allow separate estimation of those two components -see parameters β and δ below.
LBA drift rates are distributed across trials according to truncated normal distributions (positive values only). A full model could include 24 drift rate parameters: a mean and a standard deviation for each of the two racing accumulators, for each of the six stimulus conditions. We have limited the complexity of the model by assuming that the standard deviation of the drift rate distributions is 1.0 for the accumulator corresponding to the correct response in all coherence conditions. In the zero-coherence condition, we assumed that the drift rates are identically distributed for the two responses, reflecting the lack of information (note that this is not strictly necessary, as the monkeys could have been biased). This makes for 16 drift rate parameters in total, for the six coherence conditions. That is, a single mean drift rate parameter for all distributions in the zero-coherence condition (unit standard deviation for all those distributions), and then in each of the other five coherence conditions there are three parameters: one mean drift rate for the accumulator corresponding to the correct response, and one mean drift rate and one standard deviation for the accumulator corresponding to the incorrect response.
With those assumptions, the likelihood of a particular response time and response choice was derived by Brown and Heathcote (2008) . The amount of evidence in an accumulator (also called its activation) is a line with intercept given by the start point and slope given by the drift rate. Call this quantity x(t).
by two parameters: its width (δ) and depth (∆).
The period following the dip-and-recover is the sole period of firing which is assumed to be related to evidence accumulation. During this period, the firing rate increases linearly toward threshold value. If the threshold is reached, a decision response is triggered. No parameters are required for the height of the threshold or the time taken to reach threshold, as these quantities are constrained by the link with the LBA model. The height is inferred from the LBA model's threshold parameter, b, via the linking assumption. The time taken to reach threshold is inferred from the observed response time, i.e.: RT ij − δ − β. When the threshold is reached, an overt behavioral response (i.e., a saccade) occurs after a delay of length β. The firing rate drops from its threshold value to a post-decision baseline rate of ω. This drop is linear over the period from β before the saccade to γ after the saccade.
The above assumptions determine the instantaneous firing rate function, λ(t) over the recording period. With this calculated, the likelihood of the spike times observed during trial i of session j is given by:
The integral is over the recording interval, T = (T start ij , T end ij ). We use C ij [k] to indicate the k th element of the vector of spike arrival times C ij , k = 1 . . . n ij . Equation 2 is just the standard density function for a non-homogeneous Poisson process (Weinberg, Brown, & Stroud, 2007) .
implied by different start points. This integration is simple to accomplish numerically, but is computationally costly.
Without start point variability, as here, the joint likelihood for a single trial's neural and behavioral data can be specified in closed form. Let φ + (.|µ, σ) represent the density of a normal distribution truncated to positive values, with mean µ and standard deviation σ, and let Φ + (.|µ, σ) represent the corresponding cumulative distribution function. Let v r and s r be the mean and standard deviation parameters of the truncated normal distribution of drift rates for the accumulator corresponding to the recorded neuron, and v o and s o be the corresponding parameters for the other accumulator. If we denote by Θ a vector of all the model parameters, then the joint likelihood is given by:
where L(C ij |Θ) is given by Equation 2. The first three terms of Equation 3 correspond to the standard LBA model density (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) .
We estimated the posterior distributions over the parameters of the joint model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. The hierarchy allows all model parameters to vary with session (i.e., neuron) and imposes truncated normal distributions on these sessionwise parameters. The session-wise parameters, as well as the mean and standard deviation parameters of the group-level truncated normal distributions were estimated simultaneously, but separately for monkeys "B" and "N". Samples were drawn using Markov chain Monte-Carlo with proposals generated by differential evolution (B. M. Turner, Sederberg, . We used 60 sampling chains, drew 5,000 samples from each, and used random, widely-distributed start points. We discarded the first 4,000 samples from each chain as burn-in, and confirmed convergence of the Markov chains by graphical inspection.
We imposed moderately informed priors on the mean and standard deviation parameters of the group-level distributions. These priors were informed by results from Roitman and Shadlen (2002) (for the neural parameters) and from previous fits of the LBA model (for the behavioral parameters). In all cases, the prior distributions were wide enough to encompass more than double the range of plausible values. The priors for all mean (µ) parameters were positive-only truncated normal distributions and for all standard deviation (σ) parameters were gamma distributions, with settings given in Table 1. Note that the priors on the drift rate distributions' means and standard deviations (v and s) are identical for all coherence conditions, and for both accumulators. Table 2 summarizes the posterior distributions for all monkey-level parameters. Therefore, the table contains two rows for each session-level parameter: one row for the mean and one row for the standard deviation parameter of the corresponding monkey-level truncated normal distribution. 
